Analysis of decentralized production-inventory system by Caldentey, René. et al.
U11
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Sloan School of Management
Working Paper
Analysis of Decentralized Production-Inventory System
Ren6 Caldentey
Lawrence M. Wein
November 22, 1999
Working Paper Number 4099
Contact Address:
Prof. Lawrence M.Wein
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02142-1343
Lwein@mit.edu
http://web.mit.edu/lwein/www/
Analysis of a Decentralized Production-Inventory System
Rene Caldentey* Lawrence M. WVein t
November 22, 1999
Abstract
We model an isolated portion of a competitive supply chain as a M/M/1 make-to-
stock queue. The retailer carries finished goods inventory to service a Poisson demand
process, and specifies a policy for replenishing his inventory from an upstream supplier.
The supplier chooses the service rate, i.e., capacity, of his manufacturing facility, which
behaves as a single-server queue with exponential service times. Demand is backlogged
and both agents share the backorder cost. In addition, a linear inventory holding
cost is charged to the retailer, and a linear cost for building production capacity is
incurred by the supplier. The inventory level, demand rate and cost parameters are
common knowledge to both agents. Under the continuous state approximation that the
M/M/1 queue has an exponential rather than geometric steady-state distribution, we
characterize the optimal centralized and Nash solutions, and show that a contract with
linear transfer payments based on backorder, inventory and capacity levels coordinates
the system in the absence of participation constraints. We also derive explicit formulas
to assess the inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium, compare the agents' decision variables
and the customer service level of the centralized versus Nash solutions, and identify
conditions under which a coordinating contract is desirable for both agents.
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1 Introduction
Within many supply chains, a devoted upstream agent, referred to here as the supplier,
produces goods for a downstream agent, called the retailer, in a make-to-stock manner.
Broadly speaking, the performance (e.g., service levels, cost to produce and hold items) of
this isolated portion of the supply chain is dictated by three factors: (i) Retailer demand,
which is largely exogeneous but can in some cases be manipulated via pricing and advertising,
(ii) the effectiveness of the supplier's production process and the subsequent transportation
of goods, and (iii) the inventory replenishment policy, by which retailer demand is mapped
into orders placed with the supplier. If the supplier and retailer are under different ownership
or are independent entities within the same firm, then their competing objectives can lead
to severe coordination problems: The supplier typically wants to build as little capacity as
possible and receive excellent demand forecasts and/or a steady stream of orders, while the
retailer prefers to hold very little inventory and desires rapid response from the supplier.
These tensions may deteriorate overall system performance.
The recent explosion in the academic supply chain management literature is aimed at this
type of multi-agent problem. Almost without exception, the papers that incorporate stochas-
tic demand employ variants of one of two prototypical operations management models: The
newsvendor model or the Clark-Scarf (1960) multi-echelon inventory model. One-period and
two-period versions of newsvendor supply chain models have been studied intensively to ad-
dress the three factors above; see Agrawal et al. (1999), Cachon (1999) and Lariviere (1999)
for recent reviews. Although many valuable insights have been generated by this work,
these models are primarily useful for style goods and products with very short life cycles.
More complex (multi-period, and possibly multi-echelon and positive lead time) supply chain
models have been used to analyze the case where a product experiences ongoing production
and demand. Of the three factors in the last paragraph, these multi-period supply chain
models successfully capture the replenishment policy and have addressed some aspects of
retailer demand, e.g., information lead times in the Clark-Scarf model (Chen 1999), pricing
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in multi-echelon models with deterministic demand and ordering costs (Chen et al. 1999),
and forecast updates (Anupindi and Bassok 1999 in a multi-period newsvendor model and
Tsay and Lovejoy 1999 in a multi-stage model). However, the Clark-Scarf model, and indeed
all of traditional inventory theory, takes a crude approach towards the supplier's production
process, by assuming that lead times are independent of the ordering process, or equivalently,
that the production process is an infinite-server queue.
In this paper, we use an alternative prototypical model, an RI/M/1 make-to-stock queue,
to analyze a supply chain. Here, the supplier is modeled as a single-server queue, rather than
an infinite-server queue, and the retailer's optimal inventory replenishment strategy is a base
stock policy. Because the production system is explicitly incorporated, these make-to-stock
queues are also referred to as production-inventory systems. The M/M/1 make-to-stock
queue was introduced by Morse (1958), but lay mysteriouly dormant for the next three
decades, perhaps because the multi-echelon version of it lacked the attractive decomposition
property of the Clark-Scarf model and traditional (i.e., make-to-order) queueing networks,
except under some restrictive inventory policies (Rubio and Wein 1996). Make-to-stock
queueing systems have experienced a revival in the 1990s, including multi-product queues
with (e.g., Federgruen and Katalan 1996, Markowitz et al. 1999) and without (e.g., Zheng
and Zipkin 1990, Wein 1992) setups, and single-product, multi-stage systems in continuous
time (e.g., Buzacott et al. 1992, Lee and Zipkin 1992) and discrete time (e.g., Glasserman
and Tayur 1995 and Gavirneni et al. 1996, building on earlier work by Federgruen and
Zipkin 1986). Although these papers either undertake a performance analysis or consider a
centralized decision maker (Gaverneni et al. analyze their system under various informational
structures, but not in a game-theoretic setting), the make-to-stock queue is amenable to
a competitive analysis because it explicitly captures the trade-off between the supplier's
capacity choice and the retailer's choice of base stock level. However, the model treats
the third key factor in a naive way, by assuming that retailer demand is an exogenous
Poisson process. Moreover, we assume that the system state, the demand rate and the
cost parameters are known by each agent. While this assumption is admittedly crude, we
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believe it is an appropriate starting point for exploring competitive make-to-stock queues.
In the only other multi-agent production-inventory study that we are aware of, Plambeck
and Zenios (1999), contemporaneously to us, analyze a more complex dynamic system with
information asymmetry.
In an attempt to isolate - and hence understand - the impact of incorporating capacity
into a supply chain model, we intentionally mimic Cachon and Zipkin (1999). Their two-
stage Clark-Scarf model is quite similar to our 11///l make-to-stock queue: Both models
have two players, assume linear backorder and holding costs for retailer inventory (where the
backorder costs are shared by both agents), employ steady-state analyses, and ignore fixed
ordering costs. The key distinction between the two models is that the production stage is an
infinite-server queue and the supplier controls his (local or echelon) inventory level in Cachon
and Zipkin, whereas in our paper the production stage is modeled as a single-server queue
and the supplier controls the capacity level, which in turn dictates a steady-state lead time
distribution. While Cachon and Zipkin's supplier incurs a linear inventory holding cost, our
supplier is subjected to a linear capacity cost. Another deviation in the formulations is that
Cachon and Zipkin's agents minimize cost, while our agents maximize profit; this allows us to
explicitly incorporate participation (i.e., nonnegative profits) constraints. A minor difference
is that our queueing model is in continuous time, while Cachon and Zipkin's inventory model
is in discrete time. In fact, to make our results more transparent and to maintain a closer
match of the two models, we use a continuous state approximation, essentially replacing the
geometric steady-state distribution of the //lM/1 queue by an exponential distribution with
the same mean.
After defining the model in §2, we derive the centralized solution in §3, where a single
decision maker optimizes system performance, and the Nash equilibrium in §4, where the
supplier and retailer maximize their own profit. The two solutions are compared in §5. In §6,
we describe the contract that coordinates the system; i.e., allows the decentralized system to
achieve the same profit as the centralized system. In §7, we analyze the Stackelberg games,
where one agent has all the bargaining power. Concluding remarks are presented in §8.
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2 The Model
Our idealized supply chain consists of a supplier providing a single product to a retailer.
Retailer demand is modeled as a homogeneous Poisson process with rate A. The retailer
carries inventory to service this demand, and unsatisfied demand is backordered. The retailer
uses a (s - 1, s) base stock policy to replenish his inventory. That is, the inventory initially
contains s units, and the retailer places an order for one unit with the supplier at each epoch
of the Poisson demand process. Because we assume that there are no fixed ordering costs,
the retailer's optimal replenishment policy is indeed characterized by the base stock level s.
The supplier's production facility is modeled as a single-server queue with service times
that are exponentially distributed with rate M. The supplier is responsible for choosing the
parameter , which will also be referred to as the capacity. The server is only busy when
retailer orders are present in the queue. The supplier's facility behaves as a M/M/11 queue
because the demand process is Poisson and a base stock policy is used.
The selling price r that the retailer charges to the end customers and the wholesale price
w that the retailer pays to the supplier are fixed. These conditions implicitly assume that
the retailer and supplier operate in competitive markets. Each backordered unit generates
a cost b per unit of time for the production-inventory system. As in Cachon and Zipkin,
this backorder cost is split between the two agents, with a fraction a E [0, 1] incurred by
the retailer. The parameter c, which we refer to as the backorder allocation fraction, is
exogenously specified in our model. In addition, the retailer incurs a holding cost h per
unit of inventory per unit of time. The supplier is responsible for building production
capacity and the capacity cost c is per unit of product, so that c,/ is cost per unit time. We
assume r > w > c, so that positive profits are not unattainable. To make our results more
transparent, we normalize the expected profit per unit time by dividing it by the holding
cost rate h. Towards this end, we normalize the cost parameters as follows:
h b - Ac Ar Aw
h= = , b=-, c= -, r= w = (1)h h' h h' h
To ease the notation, we hereafter omit the tildes from these cost parameters.
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Let N be the steady-state number of orders at the supplier's manufacturing facility. If we
assume for now that ,u > A (this point is revisited later), then N is geometrically distributed
with mean v-1, where
/-
v= lu . (2)
This parameter, which represents the normalized excess capacity, is the supplier's decision
variable in our analysis, and we often refer to it simply as capacity. To simplify our analysis,
we assume that N is a continuous random variable, and replace the geometric distribution by
an exponential distribution with parameter v. This continuous state approximation can be
justified by a heavy traffic approximation (e.g., §10 of Harrison 1988), and leads to slightly
different quantitative results (the approximation tends to underestimate the optimal discrete
base stock level). However, it has no effect on the qualitative system behavior, which is the
object of our study.
Because the revenues for each agent are fixed, profit maximization and cost minimiza-
tion lead to the same solution. We employ profit maximization to explicitly incorporate the
agents' participation constraints, which take the form of nonnegative expected profits. How-
ever, we introduce some variable cost notation (CR and Cs) in equations (3)-(4) for future
reference when discussing the inefficiency of the Nash solution (§5) and contracts that coor-
dinate the system (§6). In these equations, the quantities r - w and w - c are independent
of the supply chain decisions (c is the normalized capacity cost if no excess capacity is built)
and represent fixed profits for the respective agents. The steady-state expected normalized
profit per unit time for the risk-neutral retailer (R) and supplier (Ils) in terms of the two
decision variables are given by
HR(S, V) = r - w - CR(s, )' (3)
r- - E[(s- N)+ ] - bE[(N-s)+]
1 - e- VS es
r-w-s+ -oab
and
Is(s, v) = w-c-Cs(s, ) (4)
6
= w-c-(1 - a)bE[(V - s)] - cv
= - c(1 + v) - (1-)b -
3 The Centralized Solution
As a reference point for the efficiency of the two-agent system, we start by finding the optimal
solution to the centralized version of the problem, where there is a single decision maker that
simultaneously optimizes the base stock level s and the normalized excess capacity v. The
steady-state expected normalized profit per unit time 1I (defined in terms of the total variable
cost C = CR + CS) for this decision maker is
I(s, v) = ITR(, ) + TS(S, ) (5)
= r-c-C(s,v)
1 - (b + 1)e--s
r - c(l +-) -s+ v
The centralized solution is given in Proposition 1; see the Appendix or the proof.
Proposition 1 If r - c > 2cln(1 + b), then the optimal centralized solution is the unique
solution to the first-order conditions
I(s,)s =0 ys=ln(l+b), (6)
Os
On(s, u) e- Vs 1
av =0 = =o -(b + 1)(vs + 1) 2 + + = 0, (7)
and is given by
v*= ln(1b) and s*= cln(1 + b). (8)
C
The resulting profit is
I(s*, v*) - r-c- 2cln(1 + b). (9)
If r-c < 2/cln(1 + b), then the system generates negative profits and the optimal centralized
solution is to not operate the supply chain.
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By relation (6), the ratio of the base stock level, s, to the supplier's mean queue length,
y-l, satisfies s = ln(1 + b) at optimality, which corresponds to a Pareto frontier for the
selection of s and v. (The corresponding first-order conditions for the discrete inventory
problem is ln(v + 1)s = ln(1 + b), and so our continuous approximation can be viewed as
using the Taylor series approximation ln(v + 1) . v.) Although this ratio is independent
of the capacity cost c, the optimal point on this Pareto frontier depends on c via s = vc
according to (8).
As expected, the optimal capacity level decreases with the capacity cost and increases
with the backorder-to-holding cost ratio b. Similarly, because capacity and safety stock
provide alternative means to avoid backorders, the optimal base stock level increases with
the capacity cost and with the normalized backorder cost b. Finally, as expected, neither
w nor a, play any role in this single-agent optimization, because transfer payments between
the retailer and the supplier do no affect the centralized profit.
4 The Nash Solution
Under the Nash equilibrium concept, the retailer chooses s to maximize IR(S, v), assum-
ing that the supplier chooses v to maximize 1-Is(s, v); likewise, the supplier simultaneously
chooses v to maximize ns(s; v) assuming the retailer chooses s to maximize rIR(S, v). Be-
cause each agent's strategy is a best response to the other's, neither agent is motivated to
depart from this equilibrium.
Our results are most easily presented by deriving the Nash equilibrium in the absence
of participation constraints, which is done in the next proposition, and then incorporating
the participation constraints, nR > 0 and Is > 0. In anticipation of subsequent analysis,
we express the Nash equilibrium in terms of the backorder allocation fraction c. Let us also
define the auxilliary function
f(b) (1- )b(ln(l + ab) + 1)
(1 + ab)ln(1 + b)
8
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which plays a prominent role in our analysis.
Proposition 2 In the absence of participation constraints, the unique Nash equilibrium is
~ = f(b)v*, (11)
( In(l + b) )* (12)
The resulting profits, FlM(a) and T1;(a), are
n(a) = nIR(S, ) = r- w - s, (13)
(ln(l+acb)+2 cv
Proof: Let s*(v) be the retailer's reaction curve, i.e., the optimal base stock level given a
capacity v installed by the supplier. Because (3) is concave in s, s*(v) is characterized by
the first-order condition
vs*(v) = ln(1 + oab). (15)
Using a similar argument, we find that the supplier's reaction curve v*(s) satisfies
e* (s)s (V*s)s I ) (-)bS2' (16)
The unique solution to (15)-(16) is (11)-(12), and substituting this solution into (3)-(4)
yields (13)-(14). *
Because f,(b) is decreasing in a and ln(1 + ab) is increasing in a for b > 0, it follows that
as a increases, the retailer becomes more concerned with backorders and increases his base
stock level, while the supplier cares less about backorders and builds less excess capacity.
As mentioned previously, we assume that the two agents do not participate in the game
unless their expected normalized profits in (13)-(14) are nonnegative. Hence, if either of these
profits are negative, the Nash equilibrium (in the presence of participation constraints) is an
inoperative supply chain. The remainder of this section is devoted to an analysis of these
profits as a function of a. The supplier's profit II(a) is an increasing function of a that
satisfies
In(0) = w- c- 257, nl* (1) = w- c,
9
and rI(a) is a decreasing function of a that satisfies
rI(O0) = r - w, lim Ik(ca) - -oc, (17)
as shown in Figure 1. (Many of the limits taken in this paper, e.g., a - 1, are implicitly
taken to be one-sided.)
r-w
0
w-c-2 b
Figure 1: The retailer's (IIR) and supplier's (Ils) profits in the Nash equilibrium as a function of the
backorder allocation fraction a.
To understand the unbounded retailer losses in (17), note that for the extreme case
a = 1, the supplier does not face any backorder cost and consequently has no incentive to
build excess capacity, i.e, v* = 0. This corresponds to the null recurrent case of a queueing
system with an arrival rate equal to its service rate, and s = co; There is no base stock level
that allows the retailer to maintain finite inventory (backorder plus holding) costs. Hence,
this production-inventory system is unstable when a = 1 and the Nash equilibrium is that
the retailer does not participate, and the supply chain does not operate.
More generally, there exist Camin and cmax such that FIl(a) > 0 and rI(ca) > 0 if and
only if ca E [min, Cmax] That is, the Nash equilibrium is an inoperative supply chain when
a < min or a > max,,. The threshold tma E (0, 1), and solves
- w=ln( + b)(b) ) (18)
10
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If w - c > 2bc, then camin = 0. Otherwise, amin solves
(ln(l +ab) + 2) f (b) s (19)
We have been unable to explicitly solve for amax and cOmin in (18)-(19). However, to
increase our understanding of these two equations, we investigate the solution in two extreme
cases: When backorders are much less costly than holding inventory (b << 1), we have
O -max- F ( -- W)4 +-r(r--w) a2bc (- )2m ( - (20)
2bc ' 4bc
When backorder costs are very large,
(r - w)2 ln(1 + b)c
amax ln(1 + b)c + (r - W)2 Lmin ln(1 + b)c + ( - )2 ' (21)
Even under the assumption r > w > c, it is possible that aVmin > amax in (20)-(21). In this
situation, even though each agent is willing to participate for some values of ac, it is not
possible for the retailer and supplier to simultaneously earn nonnegative profits.
5 Comparison of Solutions
In this section, we compare the centralized solution and the Nash equilibrium with respect
to the total system profit, the agents' decisions, and the consumers of the product.
The Nash equilibrium is inefficient. As in §4, it is convenient to first quantify the
inefficiency of the Nash equilibrium in the absence of participation constraints, and then to
incorporate them later. In the absence of participation constraints, the centralized solution
is not achievable as a Nash equilibrium. By equations (6) and (15), the first-order conditions
are vs* = ln(1 + b) in the centralized solution and s* = ln(1 + ab) in the Nash solution.
Hence, the two solutions are not equal when a < 1, and the Nash equilibrium in the a = 1
case is an unstable system, as discussed earlier.
The magnitude of the inefficiency of a Nash equilibrium is typically quantified by com-
paring the profits under the centralized and Nash solutions. Because the profits r - w and
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w - c are fixed in (3)-(4), it is more natural to restrict ourselves to the variable costs. This
assumption also allows us to follow Cachon and Zipkin and compute the competition penalty,
which is defined as the percentage' increase in variable cost of the Nash equilibrium over the
centralized solution. By (5) and (8), the variable cost for the centralized solution is
C(s*, I)= (v) - 1)+ + be- cv* = 2cln(1 + b),
and the variable cost C, associated with the Nash equilibrium in the absence of participation
constraints is, by (3)-(4) and Proposition 2,
C; = CR(S, LC(b)I(l + ) = b) + ln(1 + ab) (b)
f, [ In(l + ab) + 1 In( + b)f,(b)
Hence, the competition penalty in the absence of participation constraints is C-C(s',V*) XC(s*,v*)
100%, where
C -C(S*,v*) 1 (b l In(1 + ab) +2\ ln(1 + b)
C(s*, v*) - 2 fj kjn(1 + cfb) 1 In(ln(1 + b)f(b) (22)
Surprisingly, the competition penalty in (22) is independent of the supplier's cost of excess
capacity. However, this penalty is a function of a and b, and we can simplify equation (22)
for the limiting values of these two parameters. The function f,(b) is decreasing in oa and
fl(b) = 0. Hence, the competition penalty goes to oo as a - 1. At the other extreme,
f,(b) i as or - 0, and the competition penalty in this case is given by
b
n(+b) -1 for b> 0. (23)
This function is increasing and concave in b, approaches zero as b -+ 0 and grows to ooc as
b - oo.
Turning to the backorder cost asymptotics, f (b) - A as b -+ oo, and the competition
penalty approaches
1
-_ 1. (24)
2 (1-or)
This quantity vanishes at ac = 0.5, is symmetric about o '= 0.5, is convex for a E (0, 1), and
approaches oo as a - 0 and a - 1. Finally, for the case b -+ 0, the competition penalty is
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given by
-2- a c(25)
which is an increasing convex function of a. Consistent with the previous analyses, this
penalty function vanishes as a - 0 and approaches co as a - 1.
In summary, there are two regimes, (a = 0.5, b -+ oo) and (a - 0, b - 0), where the Nash
equilibrium is asymptotically efficient, and two regimes, a - 1 and (a - 0, b -+ oo), where
the inefficiency of the Nash solution is arbitrarily large. However, because equation (22)
does not consider the agents' participation constraints, some of the large inefficiencies in the
latter regimes are not attainable by the supply chain.
To complement these asymptotic results, we compute in Table 1 the competition penalty
in (22) for various values of a and b. Our asymptotic results agree with the numbers around
the four edges of this table. Two new insights emerge from Table 1. First, the competition
penalty is minimized by a near 0.5 when b > 1. Second, the competition penalty appears to
be an increasing function of b for a < 0.5, and a U-shaped function of b for a > 0.5.
Comparison of decision variables. Figure 2 plots the optimal Nash production ca-
pacity v and the optimal Nash base stock level s as a function of a, and allows us to
compare these functions to the centralized solutions, v* and s*. Excess capacity and the
base stock level are alternative ways for the supplier and retailer, respectively, to buffer
against demand uncertainty, and Figure 2 shows that the inefficiency of the Nash solution
does not necessarly imply that these agents have less buffer resources in the Nash solution
than in the centralized solution. For both decision variables, there exist thresholds on the
value of a, denoted by a, and a , in Figure 2, that divide the regions where the agents have
more or less buffer resources than the optimal centralized solution. However, as shown in
the next proposition, at least one agent in the Nash equilibrium possesses less of his buffer
resource than the central planner.
Proposition 3 For ac and c, defined in Figure 2, we have a, > c,.
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Table 1: The competition penalty in (22) in the absence of participation constraints for different values of
the backorder-to-holding cost ratio b and the backorder allocation fraction a.
Proof: By Figure 2, if as < a, then there exists & E [, a'] such that v&s! > v*s*. However,
this inequality together with (6) and (15) implies that f(b) = ln(1 + b), i.e., & = 1. But for
a = 1 the supply chain is unstable and does not operate. Hence, vs, < v*s* for c E[0, 1),
and consequently a, > a,. *
We cannot solve for a, and oa, in closed form, except when b takes on a limiting value.
By (12), as satisfies
ln(1 + ab) (9r-1
ln(1 + b)fa(b) - -
As b -+ 0, we have fob(b) -+ 1 -a and ln(l+ab) -+ a. ' Therefore, as b -+ 0, ac satisfies
- 1, or acs = -1 0.618, which is the inverse of the golden-section number that
14
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b 0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 1
10-3 0.0% 0.2% 1.6% 6.1% 18.7% 73.9% oo%
1 20.1% 14.8% 7.8% 5.9% 12.9% 59.5% oo%
2 34.9% 23.8% 10.7% 5.8% 11.1% 56.1% oo%
3 47.1% 30.1% 12.3% 5.6% 10.2% 54.8% oo%
4 57.6% 34.9% 13.3% 5.4% 9.6% 54.1% oo%
5 67.0% 38.7% 14.0% 5.3% 9.2% 53.8% oo%
6 75.6% 41.7% 14.5% 5.2% 9.0% 53.6% oc%
7 83.5% 44.3% 14.9% 5.1% 8.8% 53.5% oo%
8 90.8% 46.4% 15.2% 5.0% 8.7% 53.5% oo%
9 97.7% 48.3% 15.4% 4.9% 8.5% 53.5% oo%
10 104.2% 49.9% 15.6% 4.8% 8.4% 53.5% oo%
10200 4.6 x 10100% 66.7% 9.2% 0.0% 9.1% 66.5% oo%
111
0 aV 1 0 S . 1
Figure 2: The optimal Nash production capacity () and the optimal Nash base stock level (s*) as a
function of the backorder allocation fraction a. The centralized solutions are v* and s*.
arises in a variety of disciplines (e.g., Vajda 1989). As b -+ oc, we have f(b) - , and
n(1+ab) In this case, a, satisfies = , or a, = 0.5. Numerical computations revealin(l+b) t 1-
that a, is unimodal in b, achieving a maximum of 0.627 at b = 1.48, and is rather insensitive
to moderate values of b (e.g., a, > 0.61 for b E [1, 10]).
By (11), c, solves fa(b) = 1. As b --+ 0, this condition becomes /1 - a = 1, which gives
a, = 0. As b -+ oc, the condition becomes 1 = 1, which is solved by c, = 0.5. Note that
a,= -a, = 0.5 as b -+ oo is consistent with our previous claim that the Nash equilibrium is
asymptotically efficient in the regime ( = 0.5, b -+ oc). A numerical study reveals that c,
is more sensitive than a, to the value of b. As b varies from 1 to 10, a, ranges from 0.28 to
0.49.
Customer service level. The exponential distribution of the queue length implies that
the steady-state probability that a customer is forced to wait because of retailer shortages
is equal to Pr(N > s) = e-"s; hence, we refer to e- s x 100% as the service level. By
equations (6) and (15), this quantity equals (1 +b) - in the centralized solution and (l+ ab) - l
in the Nash solution. Hence, customers receive better service in the centralized solution than
in the Nash equilibrium. Even though the system is not stable for a = 1, customers generally
15
desire a larger value of a; i.e., they prefer that the penalty for shortages be absorbed primarily
by the agent in direct contact with them.
6 Contracts
WVe showed in §5 that the Nash equilibrium is always inefficient when the supply chain
operates. In this section, we construct a coordinating contract that specifies linear tranfer
payments based on retailer inventory and backorder levels, the capacity level and the cost
parameters. As in our earlier analysis, this information is assumed to be common knowledge.
Cachon and Zipkin also use a linear transfer payment based on inventory levels to coordinate
their supply chain, and readers are referred to §1.5 of Cachon for a survey of alternative types
of contracts in the multi-echelon inventory setting. We do not impose an explicit constraint
that forces either agent to build a predefined level of its buffer resource. Using Cachon and
Lariviere's (1997) terminology, we assume a voluntary compliance regime, where both the
retailer and the supplier choose their buffer resource levels to maximize their own profits.
Although we have used profit maximization thus far, because the revenues are fixed our
presentation of the contract analysis is simpler - and perhaps more natural - in the setting
of variable cost minimization. Consequently, we first present the contract in the absence of
participation constraints, and at the end of this section we incorporate the revenues via the
agents' participation constraints. Because the model contains three cost components, the
most general linear transfer payment (without loss of generality, the payment is from the
supplier to the retailer) contains cost coefficients for the holding cost, backorder cost and
capacity cost, which are denoted by 'Yh, Yb and yc, respectively. The steady-state expected
normalized (recall from (1) that h = 1) transfer payment per unit time is given by
T(s, v) = y, (E[(s - N)+]) + thb (bE[(N - s)+]) + tccv. (27)
This transfer payment modifies the profit functions in (3)-(4) for the retailer and supplier,
16
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respectively, to
CR(S, ) = CR(s, ) -T(s,V) = (1 -Ah) + b(a -b)- - , (28)
CS(S, Cs(S, v) T(s, ) = (yh, + ,   - + b( - + b)- + ( + c)cv. (29)
The following proposition provides a general result for the coordination of static games with
additive utility structures, and may be applicable to other supply chain problems.
Proposition 4 Consider a static game with n players, where player i has action space Xi
for i = 1,..., n. For any action x E X 1 x X 2 X ... X X,, the utility of player i is given
by ui(x). The utility function for the centralized planner problem is EnI= ui(x), and let
x* E argmaxx EnLI ui(x) be an optimal centralized solution. For i =A j, let Tij(x) be a linear
transfer payment that player i pays to player j if the action is x. If Tij(x) = yjui(x), where
Ej- yj = 1, then x* is a Nash equilibrium of the modified static game in which player i's
utility function is given by
Ui( ) = ui() - E Ti(x) + E Tji(x).
jfi j~i
Proof: By our assumptions on Tij(x), the modified utility function for player i can be
written as
iii(Z) = (1 - EYj)Ui(Z) + -tYi uj(x) (30)
ji ii
N
= i E j(x). (31)
j=1
Hence, " i_1 i(x) = 5 =l ui(x), and x* is a Nash equilibrium of the modified game. I
Applying Proposition 4 to equations (28)-(29) shows that coordination in the absence of
participation constraints can be achieved if
-YC = - Yb = 1 - h (32)
A comparison of equations (3)-(4) and (28)-(29) implies that the modified cost functions are
given by
CR(s, v) = (1 -Yh)C(, ), CS(S, v) = YhC(s, V). (33)
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This is a consequence of the more general result in (31), which shows that any split of the
total profit is possible by selecting appropiate values of the {yi} parameters. Note that 7h
need not be in the interval [0, 1].
Although we appear to have a degree of freedom in splitting the profits via Yh, two
conditions must be met by ah to guarantee that both agents will enter into the contract.
First, both agents must be better off under the Nash equilibrium with the transfer payments
than under the Nash equilibrium without the transfer payments, i.e.,
CR(S,, V') > (1 - h)C(S, V),
Cs(s> ) > AC(S ,) .
This condition can be rewritten as a/h E [(b), 7a(b)], where
ln(1 + b)
%(b) = 1 2 ln(1 + b)f,(b)'
a(b) - f,(b) (ln(1 + ab) + 2
2 In(l +ab)+l 
The second condition on ah requires that both agents achieve a nonnegative profit. The
resulting inequalities can be calculated using equations (3)-(4), (9) and (28)-(29). Combin-
ing these two conditions, we can characterize the range of coordinating contracts that are
attractive to both agents as
max -cln(+b) (b) h < min 2cln( +b)(b) (34)
If condition (34) is satisfied, we say that the system can be coordinated (by the contract),
and the remainder of this section is devoted to an analysis of this condition. First we note
that it is always possible to coordinate the system if both agents are willing to participate
in the Nash equilibrium in §4. This conclusion stems from the fact that if both players are
willing to participate in the Nash equilibrium, then the additional profits from the centralized
solution can be split so that each agent is still willing to participate and is at least as well
off as in the Nash solution. Hence, the nontrivial cases to analyze are a E [0, cOmin) and
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a E (max, 1]; recall that these two thresholds characterize the participation constraints in
the Nash equilibrium and are defined in (18)-(19).
WVe can analyze (34) when a approaches one of its extreme values. As a -+ 0, we have
_y(b) -+1 and 7a(b) - ln(1 + ) (35)
Thus, because a -+ 0 implies that a < , equation (34) reduces to
Yh min 2/cln(l+b) ln(lb)(36)
If w - c > 2b, then the second term in the brackets in (36) achieves the minimum, and
the interval in (36) is nonempty because b > ln(1 + b) for b > 0. Because f(b) /ln(b)
as a - 0, the inequality w - c 2 can be recognized as the supplier's participation
constraint in (19) in the a - 0 case. If, on the other hand, w - c < 2v/, then (36) reduces
to
27cln( + b)2 <Zn lC~b (37)
By (9), the interval in (37) is nonempty if and only if rI(s*, *) > r - w.
To summarize, when the supplier absorbs almost all of the backorder cost (i.e., a - O0), a
coordinating contract is always possible if the supplier is willing to participate in the absence
of the contract (i.e., w - c > 2). If the centralized system profit Il(s*, v*) is less than
the retailer's fixed profit, r - w, then the supplier will not enter into the contract. Most
interesting is the intermediate case, w - c E (2 cln(1 + b), 2/-), where the system profit
is bigger than the retailer's fixed profit, but the supplier is unwilling to participate in the
absence of a contract. Here, the excess system profit enables the contract to entice the
supplier to participate in the supply chain.
Turning to the a - 1 case, we have f(b) -+ 0 and therefore 7To(b) - -oo and ,y(b) - 0.
Thus, condition (34) reduces to
r -- W
1- r - < Yh < 0, (38)
2 cln( + b)
19
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Equation (9) shows that the interval in (38) is nonempty if and only if HI(s*, v*) > w - c.
Hence, when the retailer incurs almost all of the backorder cost, the contract is attractive to
both parties if and only if the centralized system profit exceeds the supplier's fixed profit,
w - c. In this case, the contract coefficient ah < 0, and (33) implies that Cs(S, v) < 0; i.e.,
the retailer subsidizes the supplier's entire operation.
The analysis is more difficult in the general case, E (0, amin) U (max, 1). Here, we
consider the extreme values of b. As b -+ oo, (b) - 1 -1 and '%(b) - 2-
Even though (b) < Ca(b) for ao E [0, 1] in this case (this can be derived with the change of
variable x = x/-), neither of these quantities are binding in (34), and coordination becomes
impossible because the lower bound in (34) is at least 1 and the upper bound in (34) goes
to 0. In contrast, as b -- 0, _(b) and 5Y(b) are binding in (34), and _ (b) -+ 1 - and
%(b) - /- c- . Because 1 - < 1- c for a E [0, 1], coordination is always possible
as b - 0.
In conclusion, system coordination is most difficult when c takes on an extreme value. We
can show (the proof is omitted, but the result follows from our analyses of the o - 0 and a -+
1 cases) that a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for coordination is that the optimal
centralized profit exceeds the fixed profits of both agents, I (s*, v*) > max {r - w, w - c}.
Moreover, if we consider w as endogenous, then the likelihood of coordination is maximized
by minimizing the right side of this inequality. This is achieved by w = (r + c)/2, which
splits the fixed profits evenly. By (9), coordination is always possible in this case if r - c >
4 /cln(1 + b).
7 The Stackelberg Games
We conclude our study of this two-stage supply chain by considering the case where one
agent dominates.
Supplier's Stackelberg game. When the supplier is the Stackelberg leader, he chooses
v to optimize IIs(s, v) in (4), given the retailer's best response, s*(v) in (15). This straight-
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forward computation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In the absence of.participation constraints, the equilibrium in the supplier's
Stackelberg game is
5s5- 1 + n ( +1 + ln(1 + b)39)
The agents' profits are
(1- )bc
Is(s,, ~) = w - c - 2 (-)b ' YR(sa, ip) = r -w-S. (40)
'IS W - 2 1 + c4b ' '
Equation (39) implies that vas = v s, and hence the customer service level is the
same under the Stackelberg and Nash equilibria. Because the first-order conditions of the
centralized problem dictate the service level, it also follows that the Stackelberg equilibrium
is inefficient relative to the centralized solution. Not surprisingly, the supplier builds less
capacity and the retailer holds more safety stock in (39) than in the Nash equilibrium. The
discrepancy between the Stackelberg and Nash solutions increases as a and b increase.
Now we compare the profit of each agent and the entire system under the Nash and
Stackelberg equilibria. By (14), the supplier's profit in the Nash equilibrium can be written
as
_s(s, (1 - c)bc ln(1+ b)+ 2
1 + b 2 n(1 + b)+ 1
The function 2 is strictly increasing in [0, c), and is equal to 1 when x = 0. Thus,
it is always the case that nS(9, vP) > s(s*, v); this is to be expected, because the sup-
plier incorporates the retailer's best response when selecting his level of capacity. However,
Is(Oa, Pa) = FIs(s, v,,) when a = 0, a = 1 or b = 0, and so the supplier does not benefit
from being the leader in these extreme cases.
By (13) and (39), the difference in the retailer's profit between the Nash equilibrium and
the Stackelberg equilibrium is
1R(s, zV) - R(9, Pa) -s (1+ + ln(1  ab) - 1) . (41)
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As expected, the retailer is worse off in the supplier's Stackelberg equilibrium than in the
Nash equilibrium. By (8), (10), (12) and (41), the reduction in the retailer's profit from
being the follower vanishes as a -4 0 and b - 0, and increases with ac and b.
A comparison of the total system profit shows that HIR(S., ve)+IIs(sf, vo) > R(a, va)+
Is (s, i,) if and only if
(1 + b) In( + b)(1 - i ab)ln( b)- 1 + ln(1 + cab) + 1 > O. (42)(1-a)b
Condition (42) holds for large values of ac, but is not true in general. Because the left side
of (42) equals zero when a = O0, is increasing in a > a if it is increasing in a at ao, and
has a derivative with respect to ca equal to 1 - when a = 0, we conclude that for b 2
the Nash solution achieves a higher system profit than the Stackelberg equilibrium for any
value of a. If b > 2, the Nash solution is more efficient if and only if a > o, where is the
unique positive value of a that solves (42) with equality.
Now we turn to the participation constraints. We start with the follower (i.e., the retailer)
because he performs the inner maximization in this game. By (8), (10), (12) and (39), we
can express the optimal Stackelberg base stock level as
s, = ln(l + b) (1 + ab)
(1 - a)b'
Hence, it follows from (40) that the retailer's participation constraint, rIR(, Ma) > 0, is
equivalent to
(r-w) - > ln(1 + ab) 1-. (43)
c- 
The right side of (43) is increasing in a > 0, and so there exists a threshold, call it ,,max, such
that the participation constraint is satisfied if and only if a < dmax (i.e., max solves (43)
with equality). For future reference, let us also define the threshold
4bc - (w - c) 2
aemin = 4bc + b(w - c) 2 ' (44)
The supplier's profit -i(S, Ma) in (40) is nonnegative if and only if a > dmin.
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There are three cases to examine: a > max, a E [min, dmrax] and a < cmin
.
If ca > dmax
then the retailer's participation constraint is violated. To avoid an inoperative supply chain,
which would give zero profits to both agents, the supplier - as the leader - has the luxury of
selecting a capacity level that raises the retailer's expected profit to zero. That is, by (15)
the supplier chooses v, = tn(1+b), and the retailer subsequently selects s. = r - w. If the
supplier's resulting profit (see (4)) is nonnegative, i.e.,
w-c- (r-w)(1-a)b ln( + b)c > 0, (45)(1 + ab) ln(1 + ab) r-w
then this is the supplier's Stackelberg equilibrium for the a > emax. If (45) is violated, then
the equilibrium is an inoperative supply chain.
In the second case, a E [min7, max], both participation constraints are satisfied and the
Stackelberg equilibrium is given by (39). In the last case, a < amin, the supplier is unable
to earn a nonnegative expected profit, and decides not to participate. Finally; as in §4, it is
possible that kmin > kmax; in this case, there is no value of a that simultaneously provides
nonnegative profits for both agents. For brevity's sake, we do not pursue asymptotics for
amin and dmax-
Retailer's Stackelberg game. The Stackelberg problem is less tractable when the
retailer is the leader. However, the following proposition (see the Appendix for a proof)
characterizes the solution.
Proposition 6 Let (ii, s) be the equilibirum when the retailer is the Stackelberg leader in
the absence of participation constraints. Define p > 0 to be the unique nonnegative solution
of
/32 + (3 + 2) (- e- ( - s 0)) = O. (46)
Then the Stackelberg solution is
(1 - a)b(P + 1)e - P (47)
C a
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Although we do not have a closed-form solution to the retailer's Stackelberg game, the
next proposition (see the Appendix for a proof) provides a comparison between this equilib-
rium and the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 7 The following five inequalities hold:
v ~*V < so, (48)
v, _ v>, (49)
s < s3t, (50)
nR(So, Va) > UR(Sa V), (51)
Is(Oa, i1') < Rs(,, vo). (52)
While inequalities (49)-(52) mirror our results for the supplier Stackelberg game, in-
equality (48) states that the customer service level, e x 100%, is lower in the retailer's
Stackelberg equilibrium than in the supplier's Stackelberg equilibrium (and the Nash equi-
librium). Inequality (48) also implies that the retailer Stackelberg equilibrium is inefficient
relative to the centralized solution. Analytical approximations (using e -x - I - x in (46))
and numerical computations reveal that when the service level is close to 0 or 100%, both
Stackelberg games have asymptotically the same service level. The maximum difference is
approximately 9.5%, and is achieved when the service level is 76.0% for the supplier's Stack-
elberg game and 66.5% for the retailer's Stackelberg game. In a more practical example, if
the supplier's Stackelberg service level is 90.0% then the retailer's Stackelberg service level
is approximately 82%. Hence, the deterioration in customer service is not trivial.
Finally, numerical experiments under a wide range of values for a and b suggest that
the retailer's Stackelberg game achieves a higher total profit than the supplier's Stackelberg
game. However, we have been unable to provide a proof.
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8 Concluding Remarks
The distinguishing feature of our simple supply chain model is that congestion at the sup-
plier's manufacturing facility is explicitly captured via a single-server queue. Each agent has
a resource at his disposal (the supplier chooses the capacity level and the retailer chooses the
base stock level) that buffers against expensive backorders of the retailer's inventory. When
the inventory backorder cost is incurred entirely by the retailer (i.e., the backorder allocation
fraction a = 1), the supplier has no incentive to build any excess capacity, which leads to
system instability. When the supplier incurs some backorder cost ( E [0, 1)), there is a
unique Nash equilibrium in the absence of participation constraints. The Nash equilibrium
is always inefficient: The agents' selfish behavior degrades overall system performance. The
Nash equilibrium is asymptotically efficient in two cases: (i) The backorder cost goes to zero
and the retailer is not charged for backorders, and (ii) the backorder cost goes to infinity and
is split evenly between the two agents. In the absence of participation constraints, the Nash
equilibrium has an arbitrarily high inefficiency in two cases: (i) The backorder cost goes to
infinity and the supplier incurs all of the backorder cost, and (ii) the retailer incurs all of the
backorder cost. Relative to the centralized solution, the agents in the Nash equilibrium have
more buffer resources when they care sufficiently about backorders: The supplier builds more
capacity than optimal when c < a, (and c, > 0.28 if backorders are more expensive than
holding inventory) and the retailer has a larger than optimal base stock level when c > 0.63
(and in some cases, an even smaller threshold). However, at least one of the agents in the
Nash equilibrium holds a lower-than-optimal level of his buffer resource. Finally, customers
receive better service in the centralized solution than in the Nash equilibrium, and customer
service improves in the Nash setting when the retailer incurs most - but not all - of the
backorder cost.
We assume that the agents only participate if their expected profits are nonnegative. In
the Nash equilibrium, the retailer refuses to participate when a gets sufficiently large (the
inventory costs become arbitrarily large when c = 1), and the supplier may also (depending
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on the cost and revenue parameters) refuse to participate when a gets too small. A simple
linear transfer payment, which is based on actual inventory and backorder levels, the ca-
pacity level and the cost parameters, coordinates the system in the absence of participation
constraints. We derive bounds on oa for when the coordinating contract is attractive to both
parties, in that each agent achieves a nonnegative profit that is no smaller than his Nash
equilibrium profit. There are values of ct for which the contract will lead to the operation of
an otherwise inoperative supply chain; i.e., the extra system profit generated by the contract
is sufficient to entice the nonparticipating agent into playing. Overall, we find that a contract
is more likely to be entered into by both agents when the system is reasonably profitable
(i.e., the optimal profit of the centralized system is large) and relatively well-balanced (i.e.,
a is near 0.5 and the wholesale price w is intermediate between the retailer's selling price r
and the supplier's manufacturing cost c). Finally, when one of the agents is the Stackelberg
leader, he builds less of his buffer resource and receives a higher profit than in the Nash
equilibrium, and the other agent builds more of his buffer resource and receives a smaller
profit. Customer service is the same in the Nash equilibrium as when the supplier is the
Stackelberg leader, but customers fare worse when the retailer is the leader.
Recall that our model is quite similar to the two-stage inventory model of Cachon and
Zipkin: The two main differences are the single-server vs. infinite-server model for the
manufacturing process, and our inclusion of revenue, and hence participation constraints. A
key difference in the results of the two models occurs in the a = 1 case. When the supplier
does not care about retailer backorders, he builds no excess capacity in our queueing model,
whereas he holds no inventory in Cachon and Zipkin's inventory model. The effect of the
former is an unstable system, while the effect of the latter is to turn the supply chain into a
stable - albeit ineffective - make-to-order system. In Cachon and Zipkin's echelon inventory
game, the Nash solution is indeed highly inefficient when a = 1, but in the local inventory
game the median inefficiency in their computational study is only 1%. When a = 1 in
the local inventory game, the supplier's base stock level offers him little control over the
system's cost, whereas the capacity level in our model affects the entire system in a more
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profound way. On the other hand, both models predict that the inefficiency is small when
the backorder costs are shared equally. Another qualitative difference between our models
is that Cachon and Zipkin's agents hold less inventory in the Nash equilibrium than in
the centralized solution, whereas our agents build/hold a higher-than-optimal level of their
buffer resource when their share of the backorder cost is large. Again, this may be due to the
larger nonlinear effect that capacity has in a make-to-stock queue relative to the upstream
inventory in a two-stage inventory model.
In our view, the make-to-stock queue is an attractive operations management model
to embed into a game-theoretic framework. The model is in most ways richer than the
newsvendor model and is about as complex as - but considerably more tractable than - a
two-stage Clark-Scarf model. It also allows us to capture the nonlinear effect of capacity
and the impact of the retailer's order process on the supplier's lead times. Of course, none
of these models attempt to mimic the complexities of an actual supply chain. Nevertheless,
to the extent that queueing effects are present in manufacturers' production facilities, the
make-to-stock queue is a parsimonious and tractable model for deriving new insights into
multi-agent models for supply chain management.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The function rI(s, ) defined in (5) is continuously differen-
tiable and bounded above by Ar in X = (s, v) I s > 0, v > 0}. Thus, a global maximum is
either a local interior maximum that satisfies the first-order conditions or an element of the
boundary of X; alternatively, there could be no global maximum if the function increases as
s -+ oo or v -+ co.
However, we have checked that limo,,, I(s, u) - -oo for > 0, and lim -oo I(s, v) -
-oo for s > 0, which implies that a global maximum exists. From the first-order condi-
tions (6) and (7), the only interior point that is a candidate for the global maximum is
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(s*, v*). In addition, the Hessian of YI(s, v) at (s*, v*) is given by
H(s*, v*) =-( v* S*
S* c(ln(l+b)+2)
V
Because ln(1 + b) > 0 for b > 0, the Hessian is negative definite and (s*, v*) is the unique
local maximum in the interior of X. The resulting profit is FI(s*, v*) = r-c- 2 cln(1 + b).
Finally, lim,,o H(s, v) -+ -oo for s > 0, and
n(0, v) = r - - - + cv < r - - 247b < (s*, *)
I/
Thus, (s*, v*) is the unique global maximum for Il(s, v).
Proof of Proposition 6.
for v > 0, b > 0.
I
To derive the Stackelberg equilibrium, we find it convenient
to define
/ = vs, (53)
and rewrite the supplier's reaction curve (16) as
e = C
-P P2 -(1- a)bs2 ' (54)
The one-to-one correspondence between the base stock level s and the service level parameter
/3 (recall that the service level is e- : x 100%) allows the retailer in this Stackelberg game to
choose p rather than s. By (3) and (53), the retailer's profit is
nR(, ) =r-w- ( / - 1 + (1 + ab)e-)
vy
(55)
Solving (54) for s and using (53) gives
(56)vP(/) = (I - )b( + )e-3
¢
Substituting (56) into (55) yields the retailer's profit as the following concave function of
P > 0:
R() = r-w - 1-)b - + (1 + b)e-U(/3- (/3+ I)e- }
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Therefore, the first-order condition
32 ( + 2)(1 - (1 + b)e- 3) 
$ -/3 =0 (58)2( + 1)3 e 
is sufficient for optimality. Because 1 + arb = es a; and the denominator of (58) is always
positive, condition (58) is equivalent to (46). Hence, by (46), (53) and (56), the Stackelberg
equilibrium is given by (46)-(47). *
Proof of Proposition 7. To prove (48), note that the left side of (46) is positive if
> vs*. Thus, the root p of (46) must satisfy < vs*,- i.e., Id< < v*s.
To show that > v and s9 < s, we first observe that v(s) = argmax>o {fIIR(s, v)}
and a2 IR(SV) = (1a )bse- v5 < 0. Thus (e.g., Chapter 2 of Topkis 1998), 1IR(S, v) satisfies
the decreasing difference property,
d(s)< . (59)
ds -
In addition, the function e-(P3 + 1)/2 is decreasing in > 0. Hence, from (54) and
inequality (48), we conclude that , _ s< . Finally, (59) and so < s implies that v,> > v,.
The retailer's profit in (57) is a decreasing function of for , > 3 /. Hence, inequality (51)
follows from (48). To prove (52), i.e., Ils(P*, v) > Iis(/, i<), we first use (4) to rewrite the
supplier's profit as
Is(, v)= w-c( + 1)-(1 - a)be-).
The function 1Is(/, v) is increasing in for v > 0, and so inequality (48) implies that
fIs(P3*, Pa) > s(/, Pa). Hence the proof of (52) will follow if we can show that Is(/*, v,) >
FIs(/*, va). For any fixed nonnegative 3, the function Is(, v) is concave in v, achieves its
only maximum at v(/) = (L-a)be and is decreasing for v E [v(3), oo). In particular, we
have v(/*) = (- < X/1 + ln(1+ ab)= This inequality and (49) imply that) c(l+) whic(+h completes the proof of (52). b)
Hs(/*, i,~) > Ils(E*, P), which completes the proof of (52). I
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